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Long Term Care Partnerships: 
Are they ‘Fit for Purpose’? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The risk of high costs of long-term care services and supports (LTSS) is one of the largest 
uninsured risks for American families and a major challenge to the sustainability of Medicaid. 
To address the latter, the long-term care partnership (LTCP) program was an initiative 
designed to encourage middle-class individuals to purchase private long-term care insurance 
to cover at least the non-catastrophic costs of LTSS. The goal was to defer the time when an 
individual would become eligible for Medicaid to pay her LTSS expenses, and thereby reduce 
Medicaid expenditures. This paper exploits two unique sources of variation in the effects of 
LTCP, (i) the long term effects in the four states that were allowed to implement partnership 
programs in 1993-4, and (ii) the short-term effects in the states that implemented LTCP 
programs after 2005. Given the progressive development of the LTCP, we identify differences 
in trends in insurance uptake and Medicaid long-term care expenditures and claims. Both 
sources of variation suggest LTCP programs modestly stimulated LTC insurance uptake and 
slowed Medicaid LTC expenditures and claims trends. 
JEL-Code: H310, I180, I380, J140. 
Keywords: Long Term Care (LTC) Insurance, LTC Partnerships (LTCP), subsidization, 
medicaid, differences in trends, catastrophic costs. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term care services and supports (LTSS) comprise a range of services for 
people with limited capacity for self-care due to physical or cognitive disability. 1  
Expenditures for LTSS are not only a significant financial burden to families, but they 
also account for more than a third of Medicaid expenditures (Eiken et al. 2014).  There is 
growing concern that as the baby-boomers age, many of them will not have sufficient 
incomes to pay for LTSS and will become eligible for Medicaid if their need for LTSS 
becomes great enough that they require formal or paid LTSS. Barely 14 percent of 
Americans over the age of 50 purchase private insurance to protect against the costs of 
long-term care needs (Heath and Retirement Survey 2012).2  Limited private insurance 
coupled with (many people’s) failure to save enough to self-insure long-term care costs 
puts pressure on Medicaid to finance LTSS when people have exhausted their savings. 
Hence, it appears that there is some role for policy intervention. 
 
Both the federal and state governments have developed strategies that attempt to 
shift long-term care costs away from Medicaid. These include incentives at the point of 
purchase by developing both state and federal tax deductions for purchasing long-term 
care insurance (LTCI). However, analyses of these strategies indicate limited returns of 
state tax deductions on the dollar (Goda 2011); the effect of the federal tax treatment of 
long-term care insurance premiums is not known. 3  An alternative strategy aimed at 
increasing long-term care insurance purchases was to introduce incentives at the point of 
use. In particular, one version of this strategy allows people to sequester a portion of their 
assets – equivalent to the value of a special long-term care insurance policy – from 
Medicaid requirements that they spend all of their assets (other than their house or car) 
1 Most LTSS refers to personal assistance for activities of daily living (ADLs), and includes both medical 
and non-medical care (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2012). 
2 The costs of LTSS can be catastrophic for the 5% incurring amounting to 260,000 US$. In 2011, the 
average annual cost for nursing home care was over $78,000, while assisted living communities cost an 
average of almost $42,000, 18,000-day care and 30,000 home help (O’Shaughnessy 2012).  
3 The federal tax treatment of long-term care insurance premiums is that they may be counted as deductible 
medical expenses but medical expenses may only be deducted if they exceed 10 percent of a person’s 
income (for people under age 65; for those 65 years of age and older, the threshold for deducting medical 
expenses is 7.5 percent of income through 2016). 
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before becoming eligible for Medicaid coverage. This strategy was developed with 
support from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation in the 1980s and the initiative is 
known as the Long-Term Care Partnership Program (LTCP).    
 
The welfare gains from LTCP include the reduction in the financial risk exposure 
of needing LTSS, and greater control over at least the initial provision of LTSS. In 
addition, LTCP can be expected to provide an incentive for middle-income people to save 
more for possible expenses in their older years and to reduce use of “spend down” 
strategies to qualify for Medicaid coverage of LTSS. Hence, LTCP can be thought of as a 
strategy to promote private LTCI purchases and reduce Medicaid expenditures in the 
future. For this to occur, LTCP needs to alter historical trends in purchases of long-term 
care insurance and attract middle-class individuals who otherwise cannot afford LTCI. 
However, LTCP programs were not designed to specifically target middle-class 
individuals, and hence their effect depends on changing the dynamics of the LTCI 
market.  
 
The LTCP programs were initially developed in four states (California, 
Connecticut, Indiana, and New York) in the early 1990s, with grants from the Robert 
Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF). Since 2005, 36 more states also have created LTCP 
programs.  In addition to spreading the financial risk of LTSS needs, the LTCP programs 
seek to increase private LTCI coverage by linking the purchase of specific LTCI policies 
to special eligibility rules for accessing Medicaid benefits.4  However, to date there have 
been limited evaluations of the LTC that draw upon econometric techniques. Liu and 
Prince (2013), using the Health and Retirement Survey, examines the effects of being a 
state that has adopted LTCP, and finds only modest effects on LTCI uptake. However, 
the study’s empirical identification relies on the unlikely assumption that after a state 
made the LTCP available all subsequent LTCI purchases were comprised of partnership 
4 There has been considerable literature – which we substantiate later in the text – devoted to the effect of 
Medicaid as an implicit tax on long-term care insurance. The Partnership program has been conceived as a 
potential solution that groups both public and private insurance entitlements, which could plausibly 
eliminate the so-called implicit tax on Medicaid 
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policies.5  Further, Liu and Prince (2013) focuses primarily on the introduction of a new 
LTCP but does not distinguish between the two primary types of partnerships (explained 
more fully below).  Importantly, one would expect differences between those states that 
adopted the program in the 1990’s (RWJF states) and the states that did so since 2005.  
 
In this paper, we draw upon the data from LTCP states, chaining both long and 
short-run trends of LTCI uptake, and Medicaid expenditures and claims. Given that the 
introduction of the LTCP occurred over a number of years and had some marketing 
shortcomings, we focus on an examination of differences in trends in the four original 
LTCP states (“RWJF states”) compared to the rest of the United States (US) states.  
Specifically, we analyze difference in trends of the LTCP program uptake, the overall 
uptake of private LTCI contracts, and Medicaid expenditure and claims in the four 
original LTCP states (“RWJF states”) compared to the rest of the United States (US) 
states. We adopt a flexible strategy so we can separate the pre-existing trends in the 
market for LTCI from the dynamic effects of the LTCP. In the next section, we provide 
background on the market for long-term care insurance and on the Partnership program. 
In section three, we describe the data and our methods for analyzing the data.  We report 
our results in section four, and conclude with a discussion of the results’ policy 
implications in the final section. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
  
2.1 The Market for Long-Term Care Insurance 
 
The U.S. private market for long-term care insurance was established in the mid-
1980s, but demand has remained anemic since policies were first sold (Somers and 
Merrill 1991). Given the small number of Americans over age 50 who hold policies, the 
LTCI market is only a fraction of its potential size (Stoltzfus and Feng 2011; AHIP 
5 As we show below, there is wide variability in the uptake of LTCP over time, and some state show a poor 
uptake.   
 5 
                                                 
2012).6  Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find a lack of accurate perceptions regarding the 
risk of needing long-term care. In an effort to combat myopic decision-making and lack 
of consumer knowledge, a goal of the LTCP program is to educate consumers about 
potential long-term care needs and planning. 
 
With the theoretical and empirical evidence indicating that price and affordability 
are strong factors in individuals’ decision to purchase long-term care insurance, one 
would expect high estimates of price elasticity of demand for LTCI. Premiums for LTCI 
are viewed as relatively unaffordable (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 2014). 
Contributing to suggestions that LTCI is not for everyone, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) discourages consumers from buying a policy if 
premiums account for more than 7 percent of their income or if they have less than 
$35,000 in assets (Kaiser 2006; Feder et al. 2007). Moreover, many people believe that 
Medicaid is available to cover LTSS costs (creating what is known as Medicaid crowd-
out), and because a number of large LTCI insurers stopped selling policies after 2008, 
there are well-founded concerns that LTCI companies may not exist by the time an 
individual might need to use a policy.  Myopia also contributes to low demand for LTCI 
as well as any type of long-term care planning.  
 
2.2 The Partnership for Long-Term Care 
The Partnership program promotes the purchase of private long-term care 
insurance by offering policyholders’ access to Medicaid under special eligibility rules 
regarding asset levels (Meiners et al. 2002). Cost-effectiveness is a key rationale behind 
the Partnership program. Proponents of the program aim to reduce Medicaid spending in 
the future by creating an incentive for individuals to assume responsibility through LTCI 
for at least the initial phase of their need for LTSS (Rothstein 2007). It is the inter-
twining of private insurance with a public program that makes it a public-private 
partnership program. The goal is to attract individuals who might not otherwise purchase 
6 Norton (2000) provides summary explanations for a limited market for LTCI, including adverse selection, 
moral hazard, Medicaid crowd out, high administrative costs, and the long period between purchase and 
pay out. Below, we briefly review some additional demand side factors and the role of price elasticity of 
demand. 
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private LTCI so if they need formal LTSS the insurance will pay at least their initial LTC 
costs and thereby reduce the amount that Medicaid otherwise would have spent for their 
LTSS (Stone-Axelrad 2005; Meiners 2009). Although the Partnership plans were 
intended to appeal to middle-income individuals, there are no income restrictions or 
eligibility criteria for who may purchase a LTCP policy.  
 
The RWJF initiated its Partnership program demonstration in 1987, and as noted, 
the initiative led to four states implementing Partnership programs: California (1994), 
Connecticut (1992), Indiana (1993), and New York (1993) (Alper 2006). These state 
programs are referred to as the RWJF Partnership programs. Table A1 in the Appendix 
provides an overview of the different LTCP policy models that were developed in the 
RWJF programs and then evolved during their first dozen years of operation.7   
  
New York initiated the “total asset protection” policy model in its LTCP, and 
Indiana added it as an option in 1998 (ILTCIP 2011). The New York policies are required 
to pay for three years of nursing home care or six years of home care, or some 
combination of the two. A policyholder who exhausts these benefits does not have to 
spend any remaining assets before being eligible for Medicaid to pay for LTSS; such 
assets are protected under the terms of the total asset protection model. Thus, it provides 
a strong incentive to purchase long-term care insurance. The program is targeted more to 
middle and upper-income people as an alternative to transferring assets to become 
Medicaid eligible (Meiners et al. 2002; Rothstein 2007).  
 
The “dollar-for-dollar” model originated in California, Connecticut, and Indiana, 
and was adopted by New York in 2006 (Meiners et al. 2002; NYSPLTC 2011). The 
dollar-for-dollar approach allows people to buy a policy that offers a specified dollar 
amount of services and protects that same amount of assets from eligibility determination 
for Medicaid coverage of LTSS. Insurance payments for long-term care are considered 
7 Table B provides a summary of results from earlier studies of the RWJF programs. 
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the equivalent of spending or divesting assets to establish Medicaid eligibility.8  The 
dollar-for-dollar model is intended to be attractive to people with modest incomes 
because the limited coverage might still have been viewed as unaffordable without the 
asset protection. Dollar-for-dollar plans also are appealing to those with fewer resources 
because they are more likely to over-insure their assets (saving Medicaid money) than 
people with greater resources (who are more likely to over-insure risk but under-insure 
assets) (Meiners 2009). Participants must have LTSS expenses that reach their chosen 
policy maximum benefit before they can qualify for Medicaid, so holding a Partnership 
policy generally entails a limited amount of self-insurance and out-of-pocket spending 
(Meiners 2009). Policyholders who die before or while receiving policy benefits 
represent potential savings to Medicaid. 
 
Shortly after the four RWJF states established their Partnership programs, 
Congress passed a law effectively prohibiting other states from creating their own 
Partnership programs due to doubts about the effects of the policy. However, by the early 
2000s, it was clear that federal and state Medicaid costs were rising due to expenditures 
for LTSS.  Congress passed the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, which included a provision 
permitting all states to implement Partnership programs. As of November 2013, 36 states 
have implemented Partnership programs (Truven Health Analytics 2013). All new 
programs are required to use the dollar-for-dollar model.  
 
Timing remains an issue for any evaluation of the Partnership programs because 
there is generally a lag between policy purchase and benefit payout. This is more 
important regarding the cost-effectiveness and Medicaid budgetary impact than it is for 
determining the programs’ effects on LTCI market size (Meiners et al. 2002; Meiners 
2009; Ahlstrom et al. 2004). Assessments of the Partnership Programs’ budgetary impact 
8 Indiana added a total asset protection option to the dollar-for-dollar model in 1998; it operates such that 
up to a threshold amount of coverage (the dollar equivalent of the cost of four years in an average Indiana 
nursing home), the policyholder is eligible for dollar-for-dollar asset protection when determining 
eligibility for Medicaid benefits. But a person also can purchase a partnership LTCI policy that provides 
protection for costs above the dollar-for-dollar threshold. Anyone who does that receives total asset 
protection along with Medicaid benefits when they exhaust their policy benefits (Meiners et al. 2002). 
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have different conclusions. 9  The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
assumed that the program is at least budget neutral, with opportunities for savings 
because it provides an alternative to transferring assets and because income from 
protected assets can be applied to the cost of care (Meiners 2009). A Government 
Accountability Office (GAO 2007) study found that Medicaid savings were not likely but 
that costs to Medicaid would be minimal because it assumed that many participants 
would still be too wealthy to qualify for Medicaid. The GAO study also assumed that 
policyholders do not over insure their assets, which is a major source of potential savings, 
and it assumed that people do not often transfer their assets to qualify for Medicaid (GAO 
2007; Meiners 2009).  
 
 
3. DATA AND EMPRIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
3.1 Data 
Our analysis of the Partnership programs’ effects differs from earlier assessments 
because we take advantage of a dataset containing the most comprehensive data available 
on LTCI policies.  It was constructed for the purpose of examining total and Partnership 
sales of private LTCI policies by state, and covers the time period 1999 to 2008. The data 
include information (for each state) on all newly purchased LTCI contracts each year, all 
newly purchased Partnership contracts, average premiums, GDP per capita, Medicaid 
expenditure per capita, population information by age and sex, as well as various 
summary statistics and demographic information on the Partnership programs. Appendix 
C contains a full list of details on the dataset and variable construction. Table 1 provides 
a description of the key variables used, with the total number of LTCI and Partnership 
contracts per 10,000 people age 65 and older in logs.  
 
Note that we examine ‘satisfied demand’ (but not unmet demand) for both traditional and 
Partnership LTCI policies.  Our analysis does not include potentially wider demand of 
9 Table A1 in the Appendix reports a summary of the main studies undertaken to examine the immediate 
effects of LTCP. 
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those who were underwritten by insurance companies or insurance agents.10  However, 
we include the number of applications to be able to disentangle the effect of ‘satisfied’ 
demand from that of demand, which includes individuals underwritten by insurance 
companies.  Similarly, we have data on total Medicaid expenditures and the number of 
claims for LTSS.11  
 
 
[Insert Table 1, Figure 1a and 1b around here]  
 
 
Figure 1a shows the Partnership sales in California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New 
York. 12  Although Partnership policies exhibit low sales numbers, the Partnership 
numbers did not fall in 2004 like the traditional policies did. Moreover, California and 
New York follow similar trend lines, despite New York selling different Partnership 
policy types until 2006 when New York introduced dollar-for-dollar plans. Interestingly, 
there are not any substantial shifts in New York Partnership sales after 2006, although it 
is possible the new plans helped buffer sales after traditional LTCI policy rates and 
several insurers exited the market after 2004. In Connecticut, sales dropped after 2004 
but picked up again in 2008 – suggesting perhaps that among some higher-income 
consumers, Partnership policies were substituted for traditional policies. In Indiana, sales 
fell between 2002 and 2006 by half, and then stabilized. The Connecticut Partnership 
program holds public forums and gives private presentations to various organizations 
around the state; this proactive effort to educate consumers may account for 
comparatively higher sales numbers than observed in the other RWJF Partnership states. 
 
In Connecticut and Indiana, Partnership policies are a larger percentage of the LTCI 
market than in California and New York (Figure 1b). The changes over the time-period in 
the percentages represented by Partnership policies are due to different underlying 
10 Although it is common practice to equate demand and insurance uptake (e.g., Sloan and Norton (1997)), 
the latter might not necessarily apply. 
11 We are able to observe the number of policies purchased, the number of Partnership applications and the 
number of Partnership applications denied in each state. 
12 There are no yearly data for Connecticut in 2000. The total sales in 2007 in New York are an estimation 
based on Q1 and Q2 figures.  
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patterns of sales of traditional LTCI policies and Partnership policies. The large increases 
in percentage in Connecticut and Indiana in 2004 are due to declines in traditional policy 
sales whereas the decreases in percentage in 2006 are because Partnership sales declined 
and traditional policy sales increased again. The increasing percentages in 2007 and 2008 
are due to traditional policy sales declining while Partnership policies in Indiana declined 
comparatively less and increased in Connecticut. In California and New York, 
Partnership policies remain a steady percentage of overall sales, between 10 and 20 
percent. 
 
Our identification strategy relies on “exposure” to LTCP, using a zero-one variable to 
identify states that offered Partnership programs each year. In some robustness checks we 
run the analysis for the subsample excluding New York, which is the only state that does 
not follow a ‘dollar-for-dollar’ model. We analyze data after 1999, given the progressive 
implementation of LTCP schemes over time. Because there are no public available micro 
datasets that allowed us to identify whether an individual purchased a Partnership policy, 
we have relied on aggregate data on the number of Partnership contracts per state, 
alongside data on Medicaid expenditures and claims for the period. Our study 
complements preliminary evidence by examining the long-term effect of the four original 
Partnership states and the immediate short-term effect of those Partnership programs 
implemented after 2005. Specifically, we address the question of whether the 
progressively evolving market for private long-term care insurance market, which 
followed a pre-LTCP trend, might have been modified by the Partnership programs.  
 
Our dataset includes a number of different controls. In particular, we consider the size of 
the market and how concentrated it is by including the total number of LTCI policies 
purchased, the number of companies earning premiums, the state income per capita, 
average LTCI premium (but we cannot distinguish the traditional and Partnership policy 
premiums), and total state population.  
 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
 11 
Early studies of the LTCP programs focused primarily on their sales relative to potential 
buyers and the programs’ budgetary impact on Medicaid (Meiners et al. 2002). Only one 
study employs the HRS data and assumes (incorrectly) that Partnerships states would 
switch to offer Partnership contracts only (Liu and Prince 2013). To our knowledge there 
are no studies that perform a subsample econometric analysis of the LTCP. Figures 1a 
and 1b reveal a sluggish Partnership LTCI contract development with a very smooth 
trend. With the exception of Connecticut, where in some years the majority of LTCI 
contracts were indeed Partnership polices, sales of Partnership policies were small in the 
remaining three RWJF states, and overall sales of LTCI are subject to a state specific 
declining trend over time. The overwhelming picture of private LTCI sales is that of 
sluggish market penetration, with substantial declines in sales in 2004 and 2007. There 
were several contributing factors to the large decline in 2004, including general consumer 
perception of rate increases, rate stability regulation, and the exit of insurers CNA and 
AEGON from the industry, which is likely responsible for much of the decrease (Society 
of Actuaries 2005). The lower sales in 2007 and 2008 also may be attributed to rising 
premiums and more insurers exiting the market.  
 
One of the difficulties in examining effects of programs such as LTCP is separating pre-
existing trends from the dynamic effects of a policy change. LTCP might be subject to 
state specific effects, which could be captured easily, but the development of the policy 
itself might give rise to a shift in the pre-policy trend. (For example, Figures 2 and 3 
show increasing Medicaid expenditures, although state-specific data reveal that 
Partnership states have higher Medicaid expenditures for LTSS.) To address this concern, 
we analyzed trends in purchases of total LTCI policies and Partnership policies, Medicaid 
expenditures and claims for LTSS. We supplement our analyses with descriptions of 
characteristics of Partnership versus non-Partnership states.  
 
Specifically, our empirical strategy uses a quasi-treatment effect approach where we 
define an intervention variable for the states that were able to implement a LTCP 
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program – either binary or continuous when referring to market shares – and has a value 
of zero in non-Partnership states.13   
 
The specification that we primarily specify is the following: 
 
 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃1𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃2𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃3𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
 
 
where (as in Table 1) 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 can be the log of total LTCI policy sales per 10,000 people age 
65 or older, or the log of Medicaid expenditures for LTSS per 10,000 people age 65 or 
older as well as claims paid per 10,000 people age 65 and older. We define a variable 
‘LTCP’ to refer to the effect of the introduction of a LTCP program in a state, and 
another variable ‘POST’ to refer to the period post treatment. The model also contains a 
time trend, which is the same for both treated and controlled states, and is interacted with 
the LTCP and POST variables. In addition, GDP is the log of per capita income, NCom is 
the number of insurers earning premiums or paying out benefits, i is state i, t is year t, and 
σ is systematic variations by state that are constant over time – e.g., insurance preferences 
or nursing home regulations as well as time effects 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 and an idiosyncratic effect 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. All 
time-constant variables between different locations are controlled by the time trend 
interacted with Partnership status to determine if effects are due to insurance purchasing 
or Medicaid spending trends over time, rather than the presence and demand for 
Partnership insurance policies.  Robustness checks were conducted by varying the time 
trends. The parameter of interest is the value of 𝛾𝛾. 
 
All specifications provide robust standard errors when non-clustered. The baseline 
specifications are estimated by OLS, though alternative specifications use GLS with fixed 
effects to pick up alternative unobserved heterogeneity. The advantage of this strategy is 
13 Table D2 in the Appendix reports the regression results assuming a standard difference-in-differences 
model without a trend interaction. 
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that it should be able to identify the effect of treated states or RWJF states versus control 
states. Other potential explanations for differences in the expansion of the number of 
contracts, Medicaid expenditures and claims include the existence of different premiums 
across states (due to state regulations or company strategies), differences in income and 
hence capacity to pay, differences in underwriting and the extent of competition in the 
insurance market. All of these controls are combined with state-specific effects. To take 
advantage of the panel data, we estimate a fixed effects within-groups model, with the 
observations clustered by state. Theoretically, the motivation is to control for unobserved 
state-specific effects that are constant over time. Empirically, the null hypothesis of the 
Hausman test is rejected (𝜒𝜒2 = 21.60), which confirms the use of fixed effects rather than 
random effects estimation. We estimate a series of regressions with overall sales per 
person 65 and older as the dependent variable, and then a series with Partnership sales as 
the dependent variable. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
4.1 Effects on Total LTCI Uptake 
 
Table 2a reports the effect of a Partnership program on the number of LTCI policies 
purchased in a state; the estimated effect varies primarily by the empirical specification 
(in columns) followed and by the number of controls  (in rows).  Partnership status and 
time trend – controlling for per capita income, premiums, and number of insurers selling 
LTCI – have small but positive and significant effects on LTCI uptake. The results in 
Table 2a, with different specifications of the determinants of insurance contract uptake by 
state, suggest that there is a very modest but positive effect of Partnership programs on 
total LTCI uptake. One additional year of having a Partnership program increases the 
uptake of LTCI by 2% on the trend.  
 
However, when we run a subsample analysis of the periods before and after 2005 (see 
Table 2b) in order to conduct robustness checks, we find a significant negative effect of 
Partnership programs on insurance uptake for the period 2005-2008 when only the RWJF 
states are included in the sample. This result appears to be due to New York, however; 
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when New York is excluded from the RWJF states, we find no effect of the original 
Partnership programs on LTCI uptake between 2000 and 2008. Table 2c shows parameter 
estimates using the same model for overall demand, using Partnership program 
applications as a proxy for overall demand.  Again the results suggest a small effect of 
the Partnership programs on the overall trend in LTCI take-up. Moreover, the effect is 
tiny but negative when fixed effects are included.14  
 
[Insert Table 2a, Table 2b and Table 2c about here] 
 
4.2 Effects on Medicaid expenditure and claims 
 
Table 3 shows the estimated parameters of the model when the dependent variable is 
Medicaid expenditures for LTSS per 10,000 people age 65 and older in a state. The 
empirical results indicate unambiguously that the Partnership programs have had a 
negligible coefficient on the trend of Medicaid expenditures for LTSS. When a model 
with fixed effects is estimated, the estimates indicate that Medicaid expenditures grew 
during the period.  
 
Table 4 reports the results distinguishing between RWJF states and those states that 
introduced Partnership programs after 2005. Again, the results suggest that the 
Partnership programs had no short-term effect on the underlying trends for (higher) 
Medicaid expenditures for LTSS. Controlling for income per capita, premiums, 
competition, and state fixed effects, the time trend negatively impacts the total 
Partnership applications and policies purchased, which is consistent with the general 
trends illustrated in the earlier figures. 
 
 
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
 
14 Difference-in-difference estimates, such as those reported in Appendix Table D2, indicate non-significant 
effects – supporting the implication of our empirical results that the Partnership programs had little effect 
on total LTCI uptake 
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 4.2 RWJF states and Post-2005 Partnership Program States 
Most of the 36 new Partnership programs went into effect in 2008. There have been 
steady sales of a little less than 200,000 Partnership contracts per year across all new 
programs. The RWJF programs sold a total of approximately 20,000 contracts per year 
during the 2000s, so the expansion programs are generating similar sales numbers. Thus, 
the following robustness check results should be generalizable to the expansion programs 
given the similarity in trends and program structure. We have expanded the analysis by 
examining the effects on Medicaid expenditures and our results indicate that Medicaid 
expenditures and claims that are very moderate in nature.  
 
Table 3 contains parameter estimates of our model with the Partnership effects restricted 
to just the RWJF states; that is, only the four RWJF states are indicated as having 
Partnership programs. Consistent with expectations that the programs might not have an 
effect for some time on Medicaid expenditures for LTSS, the estimates indicate 
extremely tiny and largely non-significant Medicaid expenditure savings after the 
introduction of a Partnership program.  
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
Effects on Medicaid Claims 
 
We examine as a last feature the impact of Partnership programs on Medicaid claims for 
different subsamples of Partnership states displayed in Table 4. The estimation strategy 
followed here relies on employing both the variable indicating the quasi-treatment effect 
strategy and a variable for the number of years of the Partnership insurance scheme. 
Consistently, the results suggest a negligible effect of the Partnership programs and only 
negligible evidence of a reduction in Medicaid claims for non-RWJ states. However, 
these effects may be more related to between state variation – for example, states that 
were earlier adopters of their Partnership programs may be more innovative in general 
about ways to curb Medicaid cost growth. 
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 [Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
Price and Income Elasticity Estimates 
 
Table 5 provides estimates (based on the model’s parameter estimates) for price and 
income elasticities of demand for LTCI.  The elasticity estimates indicate that demand for 
LTCI is relatively price inelastic but highly income elastic, where income is measured as 
a state’s per capita income. These estimates are consistent with previous elasticity 
estimates (Courtemanche and He 2009), and have implications for public policies that are 
designed to reduce premiums for LTCI.  
 
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
 
5. Discussion  
  
Drawing on a unique dataset from 1999-2008 that contains state-specific data on long-
term care insurance contracts, Partnership LTCI contracts, and other state-specific 
information, we examined whether the presence of a Partnership program has expanded 
take-up of LTCI policies in a state’s market for private long-term care insurance.  Taking 
advantage of the fact that the introduction of Partnership programs was largely an 
exogenous event (given the moratorium in 1994) and a difference in trends empirical 
strategy, we analyzed the impact of Partnership contracts on LTCI uptake.  We find the 
impact to be non-significant. We rely on a very rich dataset that contains information on 
partnership insurance contracts, Medicaid LTC expenditure and claims data to examine 
how sensitive each was to the introduction of the Partnership programs.  
 
Our preferred estimates suggest no significant effects of the Partnership progams on 
Medicaid expenditures and claims, and very small positive effects on total long-term care 
insurance uptake. Importantly, the results remain once we control for a long list of 
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potential explanations including income, premium trends, demographics, and the 
competitive insurance environment at the state level. Several explanations for our results 
include poor targeting of the Partnership policies to middle-class individuals, along with 
poor informational and marketing campaigns about the programs (Alper 2006). It could 
be also that insurance agents believed they would earn less selling Partnership policies 
compared to standard LTCI policies since a commission is a percentage of the premium, 
and premiums for Partnership policies are lower than standard LTCI.15  
 
For all LTCI contracts, it could be that the Partnership programs’ crowd-in effect is so 
great as to obscure the crowd-out effect documented by Sloan and Norton (1997) and 
Brown and Finkelstein (2004); this seems unlikely. It is also possible that welfare 
aversion stands out as an alternative factor, as the Partnership programs can be envisaged 
as reducing the stigma in having Medicaid pay for LTSS. Consumers that can afford 
LTCI policies could be averse to the Medicaid element in the Partnership plans, and 
instead choose traditional plans. This substitution could be part of why Partnership sales 
are not a higher percentage of overall LTCI sales, particularly in New York and 
California, which are less proactive about consumer education. Welfare stigma may also 
motivate middle-income individuals to forego purchasing a Partnership policy in favor of 
limited self-insurance or to gamble on not needing long-term care. This could help 
explain lack of growth in sales to middle-income consumers, although affordability is 
almost certainly the primary obstacle to market penetration. But given the basic 
difficultly and myopia surrounding long-term care planning, it is not surprising that some 
would be averse to the idea of planning on becoming a Medicaid participant. Further 
evidence of welfare aversion is limited, and Norton (1995) shows that welfare aversion 
may increase savings in some instances as elderly individuals receive asset transfers to 
avoid Medicaid eligibility.  
 
In contrast, Partnership programs create a purchasing incentive by protecting assets up to 
the value of the insurance policy together with an insurance-created delay in Medicaid 
15 The Partnership insurance design itself is not being evaluated here and therefore any interpretation of our 
results should not include a conclusion that the Partnership design is a problem.   
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eligibility. The results of our analyses indicate that the incentive is modestly effective. Of 
course, the incentive depends on an absence of welfare stigma or on the utility from asset 
protection and Medicaid long-term care benefits outweighing the disutility generated 
from welfare participation (Moffitt 1983). However, Stuber and Kronebusch (2004) show 
that those who need Medicaid benefits are not necessarily more likely to overcome 
participation disutility; the ability to internalize welfare stigma is not systematically and 
inversely associated with individual-level needs. 
 
The price inelastic demand for Partnership policies suggests that tax incentives or 
subsidies to reduce (net) premiums will not be effective in increasing LTCI coverage. 
Extrapolations by Courtemanche and He (2009) and estimations for lower income groups 
by Goda (2011) also suggest that tax incentives do not have a significant impact on the 
purchase of long-term care insurance. Brown and Finkelstein (2011) also argue that 
increased tax incentives will be ineffective until certain Medicaid reforms take place.  
 
Ultimately, the Partnership program has no real control over the stability of the LTCI 
market or dynamic contracting issues with the LTCI market. The program has attempted 
to diminish myopic decision-making and lack of consumer knowledge, but even the 
efforts of Connecticut’s program have not produced increases in LTCI take-up necessary 
to make this a viable national solution. Affordability remains an issue: the Partnership 
programs have not made insurance policies more affordable overall (as reflected in 
Appendix D) and does not appear to have yet reduced the costs of LTSS for Medicaid.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Variable List 
Variable Description Type RWJ States, 
2000-2004: 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Non-
RWJ 
States, 
2000-
2004: 
Mean 
(SD) 
RWJ States, 
2005-2008: 
Mean (SD) 
 
Non-RWJ 
States, 
2005-
2008: 
Mean (SD) 
 Dependent Variables       
NLTCI65it Number of insured lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older (in logs)  
Continuous   
4.937 (0.303) 4.923 (0.576) 4.909 (0.488) 4.945 (0.567) 
NLTCP65it Number  of Partnership policies purchased per 10,000 people age 65 and older (in logs) Continuous  3.783 (0.699) - - 3.643 (0.388) - - 
MSLTC65it  State Medicaid expenditure on LTC per 10,000 people age 65 and older (in logs) Continuous 3.135 (0.527) 2.649 (0.489) 3.379 (0.456) 2.881 (0.469) 
MTLTC65it 
 Total (Federal and State) Medicaid expenditure on LTC per 10,000 people age 65 and older (in logs)  
Continuous 
3.895 (0.484) 3.629 (0.467) 4.129 (0.405) 3.837 (0.437) 
MTC65 it Average total Medicaid claims per 10,0000 people age 65 and older (in logs) Continuous 18.075 (0.389) 17.838 (0.354) 18.303 (0.370) 18.072 (0.330) LTCPAit Partnership policies and applications per person age 65 and older (in logs) Continuous 4.612 (0.631) - - 4.405 (0.425) - - Treatment Variables       LTCPit Dummy variable; 1= Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion) Binary 1 - 0.489 - 1 -       0.489 - 
YLTCPi Years under a Partnership program Continuous 5.213 (4.101) 0 (0) 14.5 (1.366) 0.277 (0.636) 
POSTit Dummy variable; 1= time when Partnership program active in one state i, ==Otherwise Binary 0.800 - 0 - 1 - 0.191 - Controls       
NLTCIit Number of insured lives (all policies) Continuous 27723.5 (22507.52) 9260.583 (10738.79) 
33478.88 (34261.04) 9956.952 (13102.22) 
NComit Number of companies earning premiums or paying out benefits Continuous 
43.15 (12.180) 40.264 (12.240) 48.063 (13.359) 50.277 (13.049) 
GDPit 
 
Per capita real GDP (chained 2005 dollars) in logs   Continuous 
10.712 (0.143) 10.573 (0.246) 10.793 (0.159) 10.637 (0.252) 
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Notes: Column 1 provides the mean and standard deviation in RWJ states 
for the period 2000-2004.Column 2 provides the mean and standard 
deviation in non-RWJ states for the period of 2000-2004. Column 3 
provides the mean and standard deviation in RWJ states for the period of 
2005-2008. Column 4 provides the mean and standard deviation in non-
RWJ states for the period of 2005-2008.non-RWJ states for the period of 
2000-2004. Column 3 provides the mean and standard deviation in RWJ 
states for the period of 2005-2008. Column 4 provides the mean and 
standard deviation in non-RWJ states for the period of 2005-2008 
 
Figure 1a. Partnership policies purchased by 10,0000 in RWJF States 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, New York 
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  Average premium (in logs)    Continuous 
9.314 (0.430) 9.060 (0.634) 10.211 (0.375) 10.019 (0.401) 
POPit Total population Continuous 15900000 (12800000) 4765552 (4453396) 16300000 (13300000) 4993909 (4735734)  
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Figure 1b. Percentage of partnership policies purchased in RWJF Partnership 
States 
California, Connecticut, Indiana, New York 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of State and Total Expenditure per person age 65 and olderin 
Partnership and Non-Partnership states 
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Figure 3. Average Total Medicaid Claims Paid per person age 65 or older – RWJ 
versus non-RWJ states, 2000-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2a: Total Insurance Uptake per 10,000 people age 65 and older (in logs) 
(NLTCI65it)  
– OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects Estimation   (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: OLS    LTCPit x TREND 0.000063*** 0.0000776*** 0.0000327  (0.00000225) (0.0000256) (0.0000227) LTCPit x NLTCI 0.00000828*** 0.00000965*** 0.00000593***   (0.00000107) (0.00000104) (0.00000113) 
Panel B: Random Effects    LTCPit x TREND 0.0000735 0.0000894 0.0000243  (0.0000527) (0.0000546) (0.000516) 
Panel C: Fixed Effects    LTCPit x TREND 0.0219000** 0.0493576*** 0.021182**  (0.0107054) (0.0123737) (0.0105778)     GDPit Yes Yes Yes   PREMIUMit Yes Yes Yes NComit No No Yes N = 459    Hausman Test Statistic comparing fixed effects versus random effects 
 29 
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =   32.66 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: The dependent variable, NLTCI65it, is a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older. The right-hand side variables LTCP and TREND are interacted; LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion), and TREND is a year trend term. For the basic OLS model, the right-hand side variables LTCP and NLTCI are interacted; NLTCI denoting the number of insured lives across all long-term care insurance policies. Panel A contains coefficients of OLS estimates. Panel B contains coefficients of GLS random effects estimates.  Contains coefficients of the state fixed effects model estimates. The first column contains state level controls for logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums, but no other right-hand side variables. Column (2) adds a binary variable controlling for when a Partnership program is active in a state, in addition to logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums. Column (3) controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and logged average premiums. 
 
Table 2b: Robustness Checks: Total Insurance Uptake per 10,000 people age 65 and 
older  
(in logs) (NLTCI65it) ) – OLS, 2000/2005-2008 
 
Table 2c: Partnership Policy Applications and Purchases per 10,000 people age 65 
and older  
(in logs) (LTCPA65it) – OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects Estimation   (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: OLS    LTCPit x TREND 0.0003727*** 0.000379*** 0.0003945***  (0.000059) (0.0000584) (0.0000623) 
Panel B: Random Effects    
  (1) (2) 
Panel A: OLS, Non-RWJF 2005-2008 LTCPit x TREND 0.0000689** 0.0000496  (0.0000329) (0.000033) 
Panel B: OLS, RWJF 2005-2008 LTCPit x TREND -0.1790955*** -0.1822844***  (0.0268384) (0.0391757) 
Panel C: OLS; CA, CT, IN 2000-2008   LTCPit x TREND 0.0623409 0.0607649  (0.0416671) (0.0518554)    GDPit Yes Yes PREMIUMit Yes Yes NComit No Yes Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 N = 188 (Panel A) N=16 (Panel B) Notes:  The dependent variable, NLTCI65it, is a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older.  The coefficients in Panel A are for OLS estimates using the non-RWJF states for the period of 2005-2008. The coefficients in Panel B are for OLS estimates using the RWJF states for the period of 2005-2008.  The right-hand side variables LTCP and TREND are interacted; LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJF or Expansion), and TREND is a year trend term.  The first column contains state level controls for logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums, but no other right-hand side variables. Column (2) controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and logged average premiums.  
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LTCPit x TREND 0.0002966* 0.0003148** 0.0003212**  (0.0001701) (0.0001594) (0.0001603) 
Panel C: Fixed Effects    LTCPit x TREND -0.0085044*** -0.0086049*** -0.0092194***  (0.0025463) (0.0032575) (0.0032493)     GDPit No Yes Yes   PREMIUMit No Yes Yes NComit No No Yes N = 422    Hausman Test Statistic comparing fixed effects versus random effects chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =   10.79 suggesting a fixed effects is a better estimate Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: The dependent variable a continuous variable denoting the log number of partnership policies and application per 10,000 people age 65 and older. The right-hand side variables LTCP and TREND are interacted; LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion), and TREND is a year trend term. Panel A contains coefficients of OLS estimates. Panel B contains coefficients of GLS random effects estimates. Panel C contains coefficients of the state fixed effects model estimates. The first column contains no state level controls. Column (2) controls for logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums, but no other right-hand side variables. Column (3) controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and logged average premiums. 
 
 
Table 3: Log Total and State Medicaid LTC Expenditure per 10,000 people age 65 
and older  (MTLTC65it, MSLTC65it) – OLS, 2005-2008 
  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: OLS, Non-RWJF Total Medicaid LTC Expenditures LTCPit x TREND -0.00004 -0.0000275*** 0.00000366*  (0.0000313) (0.00003) (0.0000316) 
Panel B: OLS, RWJF State Medicaid LTC Expenditures LTCPit x TREND 0.0000355 0.0000511 0.0000773**  (0.0000345) (0.000031) (0.0000352) GDPit No Yes Yes NComit No No Yes Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 N = 188 Notes: The coefficients in Panel A are for OLS estimates using the non-RWJ states for the period of 2005-2008. In Panel A, the dependent variable is MTLTC65; a continuous variable denoting logged total (Federal and State) Medicaid expenditures on LTC per 10,000 people age 65 and older.  The coefficients in Panel B are for OLS estimates using the non-RWJ states for the period of 2005-2008. In Panel B, the dependent variable is MSLTC65, continuous variable denoting logged state Medicaid expenditures on LTC per person age 65 and older.   The right-hand side variables LTCP and TREND are interacted; LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion), and TREND is a year trend term.  Column (1) does not include any state level controls. Column (2) controls for logged GDP per capita. Column (3) adds a control for insurance market competition.  
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Table 4: Log Average Total Medicaid Claims Paid Amount per 10,000 people age 65 
and older (in logs) (MTC65it) – OLS 2000/2005-2008   (1) (2) 
Panel A: OLS, RWJ 2000-2004   YLTCPi  -0.108   (0.088)  Panel B: OLS, Non-RWJ 2005-2008   YLTCPi -0.098 -0.125***  (0.030) (0.034) 
Panel C: OLS, RWJ 2005-2008   YLTCPi -0.026 -0.090  (0.060) (0.099) 
Panel D: OLS, RWJ 2000-2008   YLTCPi 0.026 -0.098  (0.021) (0.063) GDPit Yes Yes TREND No Yes NComit No No *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 N = 20 (Panel A); N=188 (Panel B); N=16 (Panel C); N=36 (Panel D) Notes: A panel including Non-RWJ states from 2000-2004 is omitted because during that period there were no extant Partnership programs in those states. The dependent variable is MTC65, a continuous variable denoting logged average total Medicaid claims per 10,000 people age 65 and older. The right-hand side variable YLTCP is a continuous variable denoting years under a Partnership program. Panel A contains coefficients of OLS estimates for RWJ states for the period of 2000-2004. Panel B contains coefficients of OLS estimates for Non-RWJ states for the period of 2005-2008. Panel C contains coefficients of OLS estimates for RWJ states for the period of 2005-2008. Panel D contains coefficients of OLS estimates for RWJ states for the period of 2000-2008. Column (1) controls for logged average GDP per capita. Column (2) adds a time trend control 
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Table 5: Income and Price Elasticity – Total Insurance Uptake per 10,000 people 
age 65 and older (in logs) (NLTCI65it) – OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects 
Estimation   (1) (2) 
Panel A: OLS   Income elasticity 0.734*** 0.834***  (0.1104) (0.1065) Price elasticity -0.304*** -0.382***  (0.0337) (0.0027) 
Panel B: Random Effects   Income elasticity 1.144*** 1.188***  (0.1979) (0.1912) Price elasticity -0.489*** -0.0091***  (0.0319) (0.0008) 
Panel C: Fixed Effects   Income elasticity 4.209*** 3.579***  (0.539) (0.565) Price elasticity -0.5847*** -0.6347***  (0.0378) (0.0403)    Competition No Yes N = 459 Hausman Test Statistic comparing fixed effects versus random effects chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) =   32.66 Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: The dependent variable a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older. The right-hand side variables LTCP and TREND are interacted; LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion), and TREND is a year trend term. For the basic OLS model, the right-hand side variables LTCP and NLTCI are interacted; NLTCI denoting the number of insured lives across all long-term care insurance policies. Panel A contains income and price elasticity using OLS estimate coefficients of logged state GPD per capita and logged average premiums. Panel B contains income and price elasticity estimates GLS random effects estimations of logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums. Panel C contains income and price elasticity using state fixed effects model estimation of logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums. The first column contains no additional right-hand side control variables. Column (2) controls for competition. 
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APPENDICES:  
 
APPENDIX A:  
 
Table A1. Long Term Care Partnership Models in the four RWJF states 
State First Year 
Operational 
Program 
Model 
Reciprocity Total 
Policies 
Purchased 
Total 
Policies 
Dropped 
Total 
Policies 
Denied 
California 1994 Dollar 
for 
Dollar 
No 142,474 as 
of 2011 Q1 
20,571 as of 
2011 Q1 
27,178 as of 
2011 Q1 
Connecticut 1992 Dollar 
for 
Dollar 
Yes, with 
Indiana in 
2001; 
National 
Reciprocity 
Compact 
2009 
54,969 as 
of 2011 Q3 
Unavailable 8,809 as of 
2011 Q3 
Indiana 1993 Dollar 
for 
Dollar; 
hybrid 
model 
with 
Total 
Asset 
1998 
Yes, 
reciprocity 
with CT in 
2001; 
National 
Reciprocity 
Compact in 
2009 
52,070 as 
of 2011 Q4 
6,461 as of 
2011 Q4 
9,826 as of 
2011 Q4 
New York 1993 Total 
Asset; 
Dollar 
for 
Dollar 
2006 Q1 
Yes, 2012 95,702 as 
of 2011 Q2 
23,292 as of 
2011 Q2 
22,531 as of 
2011 Q2 
 
APPENDIX A:  
 
Table B. Summary of previous literature 
 
Subject Author Results 
Partnership policyholder 
Income Level1 
Feder et al. (2007) CA, CT, IN majority greater 
than $350,000 in assets 
 
GAO (2007) CA, CT majority monthly 
household incomes $5,000+; 
53% of households with assets 
$350,000+; nationally only 
36% of traditional LTC 
policyholders and only 17% 
without LTC insurance have 
assets $350,000+ 
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 CT OPM (2012) Cumulative, 44% policies sold 
to households with assets 
$350,000+ (not including 
home and car) 
 
Traditional policyholder age HIAA (2000); AHIP (2012) Average buyer age in 2000: 
67; average buyer age in 2010: 
59; non-buyer: 67 
 
Partnership policyholder age CPLTC (2011) Median age 59 
 
CT OPM (2012) Average age 58 
 
ILTCP (2011) Average age 61 
NYSPLTC (2011) Average age 60 
 
Market size Stevenson et al. (2010) Growth of 18% per year 
during 1987-2001; decline by 
9% per year from 2000-2005 
 
Stoltzfus and Feng (2011) Significant sales declines in 
2008 and 2009; sales increase 
18% 2010 
Price elasticity of demand Cramer and Jensen (2006) Demand for private long-term 
care insurance: -0.23 to -0.87 
 
Courtemanche and He (2009) Demand for private long-term 
care insurance: -3.9 
 
Goda (2011) Demand for private long-term 
care insurance with respect to 
after-tax price: -3.3 
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APPENDIX C: DATA APPENDIX 
 
C.1. Dataset Sources: NAIC 
The principal source of data on the general long-term care insurance market is the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), which collects experience 
reports from companies selling insurance in the US. For long-term care insurance, the 
purpose is to monitor the amount of long-term care coverage provided and compliance 
with lifetime loss ratio standards. The Long-Term Care Reporting Forms A through C are 
filed whenever long-term care insurance is sold, regardless of the category of annual 
statement that the company files, which can be either Life, Accident and Health, Property 
and Casualty, Fraternal, and Health.  
 
Form C collects cumulative claim experience by state, and the reports from 2000 to 2008 
are one of the main components of the Private/Partnership Long-Term Care Insurance 
(P/PLTCI) dataset used in this paper (Figure C.1). Form C requires information on all 
long-term care insurance policies and contracts except for accelerated death benefit-type 
products (which is often the type of rider included in life insurance combined products). 
Long-term care insurance policies are those meeting the definition in the NAIC Long-
Term Care Insurance Model Act or anything that would have met the definition in 
previous versions of the Model Act. The experience reported is the direct experience on 
all long-term care insurance policies and contracts issued within the state, including 
Partnership policies if the state considers them long-term care insurance at the time of the 
report. The experience reported in Form C is the experience in that statement year.  
 
The experience reported for each plan is broken down by calendar duration categories of 
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5-9, 10+ years. Information for a plan of calendar duration 0 years applies to 
plans sold the same year as the statement form. Actual earned premiums and incurred 
claims are determined for each combination of calendar duration and calendar year of 
issue starting with the first year of issue; actual earned premiums are interest adjusted. 
Actual incurred claims are calculated by discounting appropriate claim payments and are 
adjusted for interest. The number of insured lives as of the end of the experience period is 
reported by calendar duration for each plan. Form C also contains information on policy 
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type (individual or group), anticipated earned premiums, anticipated incurred claims, 
policy reserves, and the company identification code (NAIC 2009).  
 
The data purchased from the NAIC was originally broken into four categories of 
company reports by year: Fraternal, Health, Life, and Property and Casualty. The first 
step was to label the columns within the .csv files and convert them into .xls files. We 
then combined the spreadsheets within each category into one single spreadsheet with 
data from 2000 to 2009. We imported the .xls files into Stata 12.1, and combined them 
into a single data file that contained all of the Form C data across all years. We sorted the 
data file by state, company code, and year. Then we order to isolate the policies newly 
active each year, and used the line number variable to create a calendar duration variable 
that corresponds to the calendar duration indicated in the text version of Form C. We 
dropped all observations except those in which the calendar duration equals zero. At this 
point it became clear that it would not be possible to separate out plans newly in force in 
2009, so all 2009 observations were dropped from P/PLTCI dataset.16 We consolidated 
the dataset by collapsing the number of insured lives variable by year and state, and then 
dropped all observations except for the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. 
 
The key variables in P/PLTCI dataset from the NAIC reports are: STABBR (state 
abbreviation), Year (Form C Statement Year), NUM_INSURED_LIVES (number of 
insured lives at end of experience period), ACT_EARNED_PREMS (actual earned 
premiums), and ACT_INCUR_CLAIMS (actual incurred claims). From these variables we 
created Avg_Premium (average premium) by dividing actual earned premiums by number 
of insured lives. To calculate price elasticity of demand, we took the log of average 
premiums (lpremium) for the logarithmic model.  
  
C.2. Partnership Programs 
C.2.1 California 
16 In 2009 the NAIC introduced a new set of forms to replace Forms A through C, in order to shift the 
reporting focus to monitoring assumptions about morbidity and persistency. Form 5 is the corresponding 
replacement for Form C; it includes data on earned premiums, incurred claims, and policies in force at the 
end of the year (NAIC 2012a). 
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The quarterly reports issued by the California Partnership for Long-Term Care (CPLTC) 
program provided data on California from 2000 to 2008. The reports include information 
on participating insurers, quarterly and cumulative statistics, maximum benefit amounts, 
policyholder age, trends, policyholders and asset protection earned, and service 
utilization. The reports were obtained from the CPLTC website (CPLTC 2008). 
 
C.2.2 Connecticut 
Data for Connecticut was gathered from the Annual Progress Reports on the Connecticut 
Partnership for Long-Term Care from 2000 to 2008. These reports provide information 
on agent training and outreach, public forums, public relations activities, outreach to 
associations and employers, program reciprocity, outreach to nursing facilities, 
presentations and media coverage, and summary statistics. The reports were obtained 
courtesy of David Guttchen of the Connecticut Partnership for Long-Term Care, along 
with Annual Program Evaluations (CT OPM 2008).  
 
C.2.3 Indiana 
The quarterly reports issued by the Indiana Long-Term Care Program (ILTCP) provide 
the data on Indiana’s program from 2000 to 2008. The reports include summary statistics, 
statistics on policyholders in benefits, claimant profiles, and age distributions. The reports 
were obtained from the ILTCP and Indiana Department of Insurance (ILTCP 2008). 
 
C.2.4 New York 
Quarterly reports issued by the NYSPLTC provided the main source of data on the New 
York program. The quarterly reports contain information on participating insurers, 
summary statistics, age distribution, and policy features. However, reports were only 
available covering the time period of Q1 2000 to Q2 2007. The data for the first half of 
2007 is doubled to obtain full estimates for 2007 in P/PLTCI dataset (NYSPLTC 2007). 
 
We created .xls files with information from each of the states’ reports, and then imported 
the spreadsheets into Stata 12.1. The four files were appended into a single Stata data file, 
which were merged into the P/PLTCI dataset.  
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The key variables from the original four Partnership programs include: Apps_Received 
(number of Partnership applications received), Policied_Purchased (number of 
Partnership policies purchased), Apps_Denied (number of Partnership applications 
denied), and PP_Married (percentage of Partnership policies purchased by married 
individuals). 
 
C.3. Population 
The primary source of population data is the US Census Bureau. The state resident 
populations are drawn from the Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex and 
Age for each state, covering April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau 
Population Division 2010a). The population estimates for the US are from the Annual 
Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex and Selected Age Groups for the United 
States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau Population Division 2010b). 
The individual .xls files were downloaded from the Census Bureau and imported into 
Stata. After appending the state and US data files, all groups were removed except for 
total population (Total_Pop), 65 and older (_65_older), 85 and older (_85_older), total 
males (TotalMales), males 65 and older (Males65older), males 85 and older 
(Males85older), total females (TotalFemales), females 65 and older (Females65older), 
females 85 and older (Females85older), and under 18 (Under_18). These variables were 
merged with P/PLTCI dataset and used to create a number of variables weighted by 
population.  
 
We calculated the percentage of people in each age group (total population, 65 and older, 
85 and older) with private long-term care insurance, e.g. NIL_Total_Pop is the total 
number of policies purchased per 100 people. For the logarithmic specifications, the log 
of the various dependent variables is taken, e.g. logNinsu65 is the log of total policies 
purchased per 100 people age 65 or older: log(NIL_65_older +1).  
 
 
C.4. Medicaid 
Medicaid expenditure data comes from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) data on state health expenditures by state of residence (CMS 2011). We use these 
 39 
estimates instead of expenditure by state of provider because per capita estimates are only 
appropriate when using state of residence estimates. MEDICAID_AGGREGATE09.CSV 
contains total Medicaid personal health care spending by state and service, from 1991 to 
2009. We converted the .csv file into .xls and aggregated spending across all spending 
codes for each state from 2000 to 2008. We imported this file into Stata, sorted by state, 
reshaped the dataset to be in long format, and then merged the total expenditure variable 
(Medicaid_Exp) with P/PLTCI dataset. For the logarithmic model, we take the log of 
Medicaid expenditure per capita (lmedicaid). 
 
C.5. GDP 
Per capita real GDP by state (chained 2005 dollars) comes from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA 2012). We imported the .xls file into Stata, reshaped it long, dropped 
regional observations, and merged the state GDP per capita variable (GDP) into P/PLTCI 
dataset. For the logarithmic model, we take the log of GDP per capita (lgdp). 
 
C.6. Expansion Partnership Programs 
The Long-Term Care Partnership Program Technical Assistance website operated by 
Truven Health Analytics for HHS provides information on the expansion Partnership 
programs (Truven Health Analytics 2012). We use the state reports to help code the 
dummy variable (Partnership) on Partnership status to equal 1 if the state has a 
Partnership program in effect that year, and to equal 0 if it does not; this variable includes 
both original RWJF and expansion Partnership programs. This dummy variable is used to 
create an interaction variable between state Partnership status and state GDP 
(int_Partnershipgdp).  
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 APPENDIX D 
Table D1. Premium comparison 
 
 
*Classification based on Partnership program status in the current year for which average 
is computed. 
 
Table D2: Total Insurance Uptake per 10,000 people age 65 and older (in logs) 
(NLTCI65it)  
– OLS, Random Effects, and Fixed Effects Estimation   (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: OLS    LTCPit 0.0013627 0.0021911 ** 0.0002559  (0.000977) (0.0010424) (.0010867)     
Panel B: Random Effects    LTCPit  0.0015615 0.0022942 -0.000294  (0.0019958) (0.002065) (0.0020051)     
Panel C: Fixed Effects    LTCPit  0.0015615 0.0022942 -0.000294  (0.0019958) (0.002065) (0.0020051)     GDPit Yes Yes Yes   PREMIUMit Yes Yes Yes   POST No Yes No NComit No No Yes N = 459    Standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Notes: The dependent variable, NLTCI65it, is a continuous variable denoting the log number of insured lives per 10,000 people age 65 and older. LTCP is a binary variable indicating status as a Partnership state (RWJ or Expansion). Panel A contains coefficients of OLS estimates. Panel B contains coefficients of GLS random effects estimates. Panel C contains coefficients of the state fixed effects model estimates. The first column contains state level controls for logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums, but no other right-hand side variables. Column (2) adds a binary variable controlling for when a Partnership program is active in a state, in addition to logged GDP per capita and logged average premiums. Column (3) controls for competition, logged GDP per capita, and logged average premiums. 
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